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CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES IN SINGLE PROSECUTIONS:
JUDICIAL MULTIPLICATION OF STATUTORY PENALTIES*
To insure that certain antisocial behavior does not escape the reach of the
criminal law, legislatures often proscribe the various elements which com-
prise an undesirable course of conduct. The result has been a proliferation
of offenses capable of commission by a single activity. On the one hand, a
particular statute may isolate and condemn a number of steps in a given
process;' such blanket prohibition facilitates conviction of participants in any
aspect of the deviant conduct.2 On the other hand, distinct statutes apparent-
ly unrelated to one another may overlap to effect a mutual proscription of
an individual action.3 While, in either case, indictment on more than one
count may aid both defendant and prosecutor, 4 imposition of consecutive
multiple sentences 5 may thwart legislative intent. For the equation of plead-
*Gore v. United States, 244 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. granted, 355 U.S. 903
(1958).
1. E.g., the federal statutory scheme dealing with counterfeiting condemns possessing
plates and concealing, manufacturing and possessing counterfeit money as well as actually
buying, selling, exchanging, transferring, receiving, delivering or passing counterfeit
money. 18 U.S.C. §§ 471-74 (1952).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Petrone, 185 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 931 (1951) (possession of counterfeit money).
3. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1. (1954), provides an example of overlapping
statutes, enacted at different times, held applicable to the same transaction. Defendants
deposited a fraudulently obtained check in a Texas bank which mailed it to California
for clearing. By "causing stolen property to be transported in interstate commerce," they
were found to have violated the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1952),
as well as the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1952).
4. While prosecutors have been criticized as "overzealous" in use of multiple count
indictments, Note, 7 BROOK.LYN L. REv. 79, 82 (1937), the practice does preserve alter-
natives upon failure of proof or variance on one count, see Leflar, The Criminal Proce-
dure Reforms of 1936-Twenty Years After, 11 ARK. L. REv. 117, 127-28 (1957). And
defendants are thus insulated from multiple prosecutions on single counts. Statutes fre-
quently provide for joinder of alleged violations in criminal trials relating to a single
act or transaction. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIm. P. 8(a) ; N.Y. CODE CRmI. PR0C. § 279;
Wis. STAT. § 939.65 (1955). See also ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(2) (Tent. Draft No.
5, 1955) (hereinafter cited as MODEL PENAL CODE) (compulsory joinder) ; Comment, 65
YALE L.J. 339, 359-61 (1956).
5. Criminal conduct can be described in terms of act, intent, consequences and law;
and multiple sentence problems may arise where an indictment, in separate counts, varies
one or more of the elements while the others remain constant. Among the possible varia-
tions are: (1) the same physical act allegedly violating several statutes; (2) defendant's
continuing acts separately charged as violating a single statute; (3) one statute and one
act producing multiple consequences. See ALI, ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
33-61 (Official Draft 1935) (hereinafter cited as ALI DRAFT), for a list of eight varia-
tions followed by a collection of cases. This Note will only deal with multiple sentence
problems arising where one act allegedly violates different statutory provisions.
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able with punishable offenses can yield a punishment far exceeding the in-
tended sanction.0
Federal narcotics laws, for example, condemn each component of an illicit
transaction in an effort to restrict drug traffic to prescribed channels. 7 The
Harrison Act prohibits the purchase, sale, distribution, dispensing, exchange
or gift of narcotics unless accompanied by treasury order forms and tax
stamps, both issued only to registered dealers.8 In addition, the purchase, sale
or concealment of illegally imported drugs, as well as the importation itself,
is a felony." Thus, a single sale may and usually does elicit an indictment on
several counts. 10 And, aided by the statutory presumption that possession
6. E.g., in United States v. Dicario, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 353, 361, 24 C.M.R. 163, 171
(1957), defendant's act of stealing letters from the mail violated both a larceny statute
and the federal mail law. The court found that "the offenses are not separately punish-
able." But the idea that several offenses separately charged and proved may constitute a
single "offense" for purposes of punishment is not easily accepted. Thus, the dissenting
opinion accused the majority of ruling that "interference with the mails is the same
offense as larceny." Nonethelesss, the indictable-punishable offense dichotomy has long
been accepted in lesser included offense cases. Defendant may be charged with and found
guilty of both the lesser and the greater offense, yet there is but a single punishable
offense. See, e.g., Costner v. United States, 139 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1943) (reversing con-
secutive sentences where assault with intent to rob was a lesser offense included in rob-
bery) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Shaddock v. Ashe, 340 Pa. 286, 17 A.2d 190 (1941) (while
assault and battery may be joined in the same indictment with rape, defendant may only
be punished for the more serious crime). See also Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322
(1957) (for purposes of punishment, the crime of entering a bank with intent to commit
a robbery merges with the crime of robbery) ; Stevens v. McClaughry, 207 Fed. 18, 21
(8th Cir. 1913); Commonwealth ex rel. Ciampoli v. Heston, 292 Pa. 501, 141 At. 287
(1928).
7. H.R. REP. No. 23, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. (1913); S. REP. No. 258, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1914); see King, Narcotic Drug Laws and Enforcement Policies, 22 LAw &
CONT.MP. PRon. 113-18 (1957) ; Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 751, 765-69 (1.953). Congress
did not intend that sales to nonmedical addicts be within legitimate channels. See IxT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4704(b)(1), 4705(c)(1) (exemption from written order form
and tax stamp requirements if drugs "issued for legitimate medical uses" or dispensed
"in the course of his [doctor's] professional practice only") ; cf. Direct Sales Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943).
8. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4704-05, 4724.
9. 35 STAT. 614 (1909), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 173 (1952).
10. See, e.g., the report on narcotics indictments in the District of Columbia for
July 1, 1954, to June 30, 1955, contained in Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Traffic in, and Control of Narcotics of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1252-58 (1956). Eighty-five per cent of the cases listed clearly involved
multiple counts, and the information on the remaining 15% is inconclusive. The consistent
practice was to charge violations of both the Harrison Act, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 4701-36, and the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, 35 STAT. 614 (1909), as
amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 173-74 (1952). See Hearings, supra at 1158-81. Even where
violation of only one act was charged, several counts may have been used. Reported
narcotics appeals cases in the various circuits indicate that such practice is widespread.
See, e.g., Long v. United States, 235 F.2d 183 (6th Cir. 1956); Martinez v. United
States, 220 F.2d 740 (1st Cir. 1955); United States v. Brown, 207 F.2d 310 (7th Cir.
1953). Nor is this method of pleading a recent innovation. See narcotics indictment form
in HOPKINs, THE NEW FEDERAL PENAL CODE 932-35 (1927) (five counts).
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evidences multiple violations," the government regularly obtains multiple con-
victions.'2
Where multiple convictions induce consecutive sentences, defendants seek-
ing relief frequently invoke the constitutional injunction against double jeop-
ardy.13 Contending that they have been twice punished for a single offense,'
4
such defendants misconceive the protection afforded by that safeguard. Double
jeopardy presumably evolved as a reaction against the prodigious prosecution
advantages and horrendous sentences of the early common law. 1 It is cur-
rently calculated to secure finality in criminal litigation and to protect de-
fendants from the threat, harassment and stigma of repeated criminal trials.1
Neither the historical nor modern functions of the doctrine encompass more
11. See Statement of Assistant Attorney General Warren Olney, III, in Hearings,
supra note 10, at 1195: "Because of the various presumptions of guilt arising from the
possession of narcotics in several of the narcotic statutes the prosecution of narcotic
violators once they have been apprehended actually presents no great problem. As a
matter of fact it is our opinion that narcotic violators are frequently convicted on evidence
that would not suffice in most other types of cases." Possession of narcotics in an un-
stamped container is prima facie evidence of unlawful purchase, sale, dispensation or
distribution, INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 4704(a) ; and the same possession may in a single
case be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction for fraudulently or knowingly
importing, receiving, concealing, buying, selling and facilitating the transportation of
illicit drugs, 35 STAT. 614 (1909), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 174 (Supp. IV, 1957) ; see,
e.g., Martinez v. United States, supra note 10; United States v. Brown, supra note 10.
12. In 1.954, over 86% of the narcotics cases tried in the federal courts resulted in
convictions-in over half of the cases, guilty pleas were entered. Hearings, supra note
10, at 1198. In the District of Columbia in 1955, convictions were obtained in 92% of
the cases that went to trial. Id. at 1259. The conviction rate in New York's Southern
District was 99.2%. Id. at 494.
13. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb; . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. For a collection of similar provisions
in state constitutions and statutes, see ALl DRA'r 62-72.
14. Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 11 (1927) (selling illicit liquor and pos-
session of the same liquor) ; Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632, 637 (1915) (breaking and
entering with intent to steal mail and stealing mail); Michener v. United States, 157
F.2d 616, 617 (8th Cir.), rev'd per curian, 331 U.S. 789 (1947) (consecutive sentences
on counts of procuring and possessing counterfeiting plates) ; Kendrick v. United States,
238 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1.956) (assault with a deadly weapon and carrying an un-
licensed weapon) ; United States v. Johnson, 235 F.2d 159, 161 (7th Cir. 1956) (purchase
and possession of narcotics incidental to sale, and sale of, narcotics).
15. See Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 339-44 (1956) ; Note, 57 YALE L.J. 132-33 (1947).
At common law, an accused felon was not allowed counsel, could not see the indictment
and could neither testify nor call witnesses in his behalf. Acquittals were rare; and con-
viction meant death, dismemberment or banishment. RADIN, ANGLO-AmERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY 228-29, 236-38 (1936); 9 HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 223-36 (2d
ed. 1938) ; 1 STEPHEN, CRIMINAL L. w OF ENGLAND C. 11 (1883).
16. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) : "The underlying idea, one
that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that
the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts
to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and in-
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than prohibition of successive prosecution. 17 Moreover, since the legislature
may, consonant with legitimate penological principles, authorize consecutive
security, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty." See also State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361, 370, 375 (Sup. Ct. 1833).
By limiting double jeopardy to situations of "exact and complete identity in the two
offenses charged," narrow judicial interpretation of the "same offense" has in many cases
effectively emasculated Fifth Amendment protection. See State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496, 122
A.2d 623 (1956), aff'd, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 4307 (U.S. May 19, 1958); People v. Ciucci, 8
Ill. 2d 619, 137 N.E.2d 40 (1956), aff'd per curiam, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 4340 (U.S. May 19,
1958) ; State v. Nash, 86 N.C. 650, 653 (1882). Thus, acquittal on a charge of larceny of
an automobile may not be a bar to prosecution for "taking, using and operating an auto-
mobile on a public highway without the owner's consent," even though both "offenses"
related to the same activity. Eastway v. State, 189 Wis. 56, 206 N.W. 879 (1926). On
the other hand, the "same transaction" approach adopted in a minority of jurisdictions
can yield protection against such prosecutions. See State v. Cooper, supra. See also
Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 340 n.5 (1956) (former jeopardy prohibition of early common
law, in practice, precluded retrial of any aspect of a factual transaction). The same
transaction test, however, has been erratically and inconsistently applied. See ALl DRAFT
29 (analyzing Georgia cases).
Policies underlying criminal double jeopardy provisions roughly parallel those of res
judicata in civil cases. "No one shall be twice vexed for the same cause" (nemo debet bis
vexari pro una et eadew causa) is the common antecedent of civil res judicata and crim-
inal autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, the common-law equivalents of the plea of for-
mer jeopardy. See 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335; PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 650 (1952) ; ALl DRAFr 7. For discussion of res judicata, see CLARK, MODERN
PLEADING 761-66 (1951). However, a res judicata approach is of limited utility in the
criminal law, for the verdict's generality makes determination of the necessarily decided
issues difficult. See, e.g., State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496, 504-06, 122 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1956),
aff'd, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 4307, 4309-10 (U.S. May 19, 1958); Rouse v. State, 202 Md. 481,
488-90, 97 A.2d 285, 288-89 (1952); Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res
Indicata, 39 IowA L. REv. 317, 332-44 (1954). A plea of res judicata, however, has suc-
cessfully barred a second criminal prosecution in those few cases where the statement direct-
ing verdict for defendant or the charge to the jury was sufficiently specific to preclude
doubt of the necessarily found facts. See Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948).
The MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.10 would bar suit even though the former prosecution
was for a different "offense" if the subsequent prosecution is for "(a) any offense of
Which the defendant could have been convicted on the first prosecution; or (b) any
offense with which the defendant should have been charged on the first prosecution under
the compulsory joinder provision of Section 1.08."
17. Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342, 349 (1941.) (dictum): "[T]he erroneous
imposition of two sentences for a single offense, of which the accused has been convicted,
or as to which he has pleaded guilty, does not constitute double jeopardy." Calvaresi v.
United States, 216 F.2d 891, 902 (10th Cir. 1954): "[T]he Fifth Amendment is not
against imposition of a double sentence for the same offense, but is against trying one
for a second time for the same offense." White v. Pescor, 155 F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1946).
See 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 659 (1833) (jeopardy refers to be-
ing twice "tried"). The Amendment as originally proposed by Madison, see 1 ANNALS
OF COIG. 451-52 (June 8, 1789), 781-82 (Aug. 17, 1789) (Gales & Seaton 1834) ("no
person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment
or one trial for the same offense"), and in its final form, was clearly intended to be a
statement of established common-law principles, and as such was understood to be a pro-
hibition of multiple trials. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's discussion of the amendment's
1958]
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sentences when a single act violates several statutory provisions, double jeop-
ardy should not be extended beyond its traditional ambit.' 8
history in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 200-02 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
Multiple count indictments were not unusual at common law, see 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 173 (Wilson ed. 1778); 1 CHrr, CRIMINAL LAW 167-72 (1819); STARIXIE,
CRIMINAL PLEADINIG 42-47 (1824), and consecutive sentencing was possible, see Rex v.
Williams, 1 Leach 529, 536, 168 Eng. Rep. 366, 370 (Twelve Judges 1790) ; 1 CHrl-,
CRIxINAL LAW 494 (1819), although unnecessary because of the capital nature of most
offenses. Nevertheless, pleas of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict apparently were con-
sidered improper unless a former trial and verdict were shown. See Case of Swan, Fost.
104, 168 Eng. Rep. 52 (Chelmsford Assizes 1751).
While the Supreme Court has occasionally granted habeas corpus review in multiple
sentence cases, the double jeorardy contentions presumably justifying the grant of review
have been uniformly rejected. See Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902) ; Ebeling
v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915) ; Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915) ; Albrecht v.
United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927) ; Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) ;
United States v. Michener, 331 U.S. 789 (1947) ; Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S.
1 (1954). Nor does Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1883), bring multiple
sentences within the sweep of the double jeopardy clause. Lange held that the Constitu-
tion barred double punishment for the same offense; but the case involved two proceed-
ings, and the sentence at the second was imposed after the first sentence had been ex-
ecuted. Moreover, the sentences were rendered under the same verdict for the same statu-
tory offense and the same act, whereas multiple sentence cases involve either different
statutory offenses, see, e.g., Morgan v. Devine, supra, or different acts, see Ebeling v.
Morgan, supra, and the sentences are imposed under different verdicts on separate counts.
18. To equate "act" or "transaction" with "offense," as it appears in the double
jeopardy clause, might unduly limit the legislature's power to declare conduct criminal
and to punish it reasonably. Where two statutes apply to the same conduct, the legis-
lature may intend cumulative punishment, particularly if multiple violations produce
greater social harm than if only one statute had been violated-e.g., where the statutes
vindicate different social norms, see notes 48-53 infra accompanying text. And "there
is nothing in the Constitution which prevents Congress from punishing separately each
step leading to the consummation of a transaction which it has power to prohibit and
punishing also the completed transaction." Albrecht v. United States, supra note 17, at
1.1. But the fact of such congressional power does not settle multiple sentence questions.
For, "when Congress has the will it has no difficulty in expressing it-when it has the
will, that is, of defining what it desires to make the unit of prosecution and, more par-
ticularly, to make each stick in a faggot a single criminal unit. When Congress leaves
to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity
should be resolved in favor of lenity." Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955)
(reversing consecutive sentences on two Mann Act counts, each count referring to a
different woman where the trip and the car involved were the same).
But see Comment, 65 YAIL L.J. 339, 340 (1956), urging that double jeopardy has
two meanings: (1) prohibition of double prosecutions for a single act or activity, and
(2) prohibition of punishment "more severely than the law provides, through the device
of finding . .. several violations of substantive law where only one exists." However,
since much of the confusion in multiple sentence cases is directly attributable to use of
traditional double jeopardy tests, see notes 21-23 infra and accompanying text, this
approach might perplex more than it clarifies. On a verbal level, at least, a defendant
who is sentenced at a single trial would not seem to be twice in jeopardy. See Kokenes
v. State, 213 Ind. 476, 480, 13 N.E.2d 524, 526 (1938) : "The contention that the convic-
tion on the first count bars a conviction on the second' is untenable, since the convictions
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Nevertheless, multiple sentence cases are often misdirected by the "same
evidence" test, a judicial gloss on the double jeopardy clause.19 Developed
as an antidote to defense claims of variance in an era of pleading formalism,
20
were simultaneous, and there was no former jeopardy." Moreover, the dual approach is
at times mutually exclusive; and the idea that rape and incest, for instance, might be
considered two "offenses" for purposes of punishment at a single trial under double
jeopardy test (2) but one "offense" for purposes of two prosecutions under double jeop-
ardy test (1), see Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 346 (1956), requires unusually careful
analysis. Finally, to extend and subdivide double jeopardy might detract from its basic
importance. See Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J.
513, 526 (1949) : "Suffering a complete new trial for substantially the same set of facts
would seem to involve a larger question of principle than the possibility of the defendant's
serving an aggravated sentence because the court failed to consider the logical relation-
ship of the various offenses and erroneously made the counts run consecutively."
On the other hand, posing the problem simply as a question of legislative intent has
few drawbacks. It might foreclose habeas corpus review, available under a double jeop-
ardy rationale. See Peters, Collateral Attack by Habeas Corpus, 23 WAsHa. L. REv. 87,
91-92 (1948). But an alternative procedure is available for attacking sentences in the
federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952). And, from a practical standpoint, habeas
corpus review in state courts may be minimal. See, e.g., Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28
(1957) (reversing, on due process grounds, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denial of
habeas corpus petition where defendant's death sentence was based on perjured evidence
knowingly elicited by the prosecutor) ; Statement of Hon. Carl V. Weygandt, C.J., Su-
preme Court of Ohio, Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on
the Judiciary on H.R. 5649, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955): "Our penitentiary has as
many curbstone lawyers as any other State penitentiary, but we at least have a con-
sistent record in Ohio that we have never allowed one of these writs of habeas corpus."
See also Shaefer, Federalism and State Crinzinal Prosecution, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1., 16-17
(1956) (suggesting that prison practices may in many states give prisoners limited access
to the courts). And it may even be possible to obtain habeas corpus review on due pro-
cess grounds. Such protection has been afforded where, for example, a prisoner is serv-
ing ten years for a crime carrying a maximum sentence of five years. See Note, 9 U.
FLA. L. REV. 348 (1956) (collecting cases).
19. See note 17 supra. Even where consecutive sentences have been reversed, whether
under a same transaction or lesser included offense rationale, double jeopardy is either
only referred to in passing or not referred to at all. See United States v. Chiarella, 187
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Schroeder v. United States, 7 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1925) ; Stevens
v. McClaughry, 207 Fed. 18 (Sth Cir. 1913). But see Tritico v. United States, 4 F.2d
664 (5th Cir. 1925) (basing reversal of consecutive sentences squarely on constitutional
grounds) ; Murphy v. United States, 285 Fed. 801, 817 (7th Cir. 1923) (same). For
criticism of the same evidence test as applied in double prosecution cases, see Lugar,
supra note 16, at 318 ("double jeopardy as currently applied ...does not appeal to the
average person's sense of fair play") ; Kirchheimer, supra note 18; Comment, 65 YALE
L.J. 339, 344-49 (1956) ; Note, 24 MINN. L. REv. 522 (1940). See also treatment of the
problem in MoDEI. PENAL CODE § 110, quoted note 16 supra.
20. Rex v. Vandercomb, 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (Ex. 1796), was the forerunner
of same evidence cases. In the first trial, a verdict was directed against the prosecution
for variance and failure of proof, the court stating, "the form of the indictment decides
the question." Id. at 711, 168 Eng. Rep. at 457. Although the original indictment had
charged defendant with burglarously breaking and entering and stealing, a second prose-
cution and conviction for burglarously breaking and entering with intent to steal was
allowed because "different" evidence was involved. See Kirchheimer, supra note 18, at
1958]
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the test bars a second prosecution only if the evidence required to prove the
second offense is the same as that needed to establish the first.21 Strictly
applied, the test offers no greater protection in multiple sentence cases than
the double jeopardy clause it implements. So long as different statutory pro-
visions are pleaded, different evidence will be necessary to prove the separate
counts.2 2 Investigation thus concluded, appellate courts generally affirm con-
527-29; Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 343-44 (1956). See also Sir Matthew Hale's com-
plaint that "more offenders escape by the over easy ear given to exceptions in indict-
ments, than by their own innocence," 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 193 (Wilson ed.
1778) ; 1 STEPHEN, CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 284-88 (1883).
21. As it appeared in Rex v. Vandercomb, supra note 20, at 720, 168 Eng. Rep. at
461, the test stated: "[U]nless the first indictment were such as the prisoner might have
been convicted upon by proof of the facts contained in the second indictment, an acquittal
on the first indictment can be no bar to the second." For variations of the rule, see
ALI DRAFT 26-27; Lugar, supra note 16, at 321-23; 7 BROOKLYN L. REV. 79, 82 (1937).
As formulated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), "the test
to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."
22. The test emphasizes theoretical rather than factual separability. Although essen-
tially the same evidence-testimony and exhibits-is in fact offered to prove two offenses,
courts point out that the counts contain different words or refer to different statutes
and demonstrate that hypothetically each count could be violated separately. See, e.g.,
Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906) (possible to "receive" an illegal bribe
without "agreeing to receive" it); Ekberg v. United States, 167 F.2d 380 (1st Cir.
1948) (conceivable to imitate a federal officer and fraudulently "obtain" a typewriter
without having fraudulently "demanded" it); United States v. Michener, 331 U.S. 789
(1947) (possible to "procure" counterfeiting plates for manufacture without "possessing"
them) ; Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 11 (1927) : "[Possessing and selling liquor]
are distinct offenses. One may obviously possess without selling; and one may sell and
cause to be delivered a thing of which he has never had possession; or one may have
possession and later sell, as appears to have been done in this case. The fact that the
person sells liquor which he possessed does not render the possession and the sale neces-
sarily a single offense." Emphasis on theoretical rather than actual evidence is most
obvious in narcotics cases where proof of possession is prima facie evidence of violation
of two different statutes. See note 11 supra; Corollo v. Dutton, 63 F.2d 7 (5th Cir.
1933). See also Martinez v. United States, 220 F.2d 740, 742 (1st Cir. 1955): "[De-
fendant argues] proof of selling heroin knowing the same to have been imported con-
trary to law (count 2) establishes every essential element of selling the same heroin not
in or from the original stamped package (count 1), for the reason that illegally im-
ported heroin would of necessity not be in or from the original stamped package. We
are not clear that this would be so. For instance, might not an importer, believing in
good faith that he had complied with the conditions prescribed for lawful importation,
pay the tax imposed by 26 U.S.C. 2550a and affix to the packaged drug the correspond-
ing revenue stamp; in which case while the importation would still be contrary to law,
would it nevertheless not be possible to make a subsequent sale of the drug in or from
the original stamped package ?"
Since strict application of the test would absolutely foreclose defendants, some courts
balk at carrying the test to logical extremes. See Robinson v. United States, 143 F.2d
276, 277 (10th Cir. 1944) ("but the same evidence test must be applied with some dis-
crimination") ; District of Columbia v. Buckley, 128 F.2d 17, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (con-
curring opinion; application of the same evidence test does not end the matter; must
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secutive sentences without inquiring whether cumulative punishment was con-
templated by the legislature.23 Application of the same evidence test accord-
ingly ranks mechanical doctrine above the gravity of the criminal conduct
and examination of the ultimate authority for imposition of punishment-the
will of the legislature.
24
also determine whether the difference is "substantial" or "minor") ; cf. Regina v. Bret-
tel, Car. & M. 609, 176 Eng. Rep. 656 (C.P. 1842) (although legally possible, "it would be
as well not to proceed with this indictment"). Or the test may be avoided by broad inter-
pretation. Ballerini v. Aderholt, 44 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1930) (one sale of narcotics vio-
lating two statutes held to be but one "criminal act") (overruled in Blockburger v.
United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)) ; Copperthwaite v. United States, 37 F.2d 846
(6th Cir. 1930): "[T]he supporting evidence [possession of narcotics] does not so ma-
terially vary as to justify two punishments, merely because two inferences are attached
by different statutes to the same evidential basis." The usual implications of the test
may be evaded by conceding the existence of separately indictable offenses but disallow-
ing consecutive punishment. Munson v. MXcClaughry, 198 Fed. 72 (8th Cir. 1912). Also
the test may be ignored and the propriety of cumulative punishment decided by reference
to legislative intent. See note 36 infra. Still another means of avoiding the impact
of the same evidence test is to hold that one offense is necessarily included in another.
Morgan v. United States, 294 Fed. 82 (4th Cir. 1923) (manufacture of moonshine
whiskey necessarily includes having possession of the whiskey and possessing property
designed for manufacture of moonshine). Differently phrased, this exception states that
where one offense is necessarily "incidental" to another, double punishment should not
be allowed. United States v. Chiarella, 187 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1951) (possession and re-
ceipt of counterfeit money incidental to sale) ; Schroeder v. United States, 7 F.2d 60
(2d Cir. 1925) (possession of liquor necessary and incidental to transportation of
liquor) ; cf. its re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889) (conviction for cohabitation bars prose-
cution for adultery because sexual intercourse a necessary ingredient of both offenses).
Strict application of the same evidence test could further reduce the small and un-
certain number of lesser included offenses. Thus, the argument that "concealing" is in-
cidental to "transporting" a stolen car can be rejected on same evidence grounds. See
United States v. Hampden, 294 Fed. 345 (E.D. Mich. 1923). Compare Albrecht v. United
States, supra, upith United States v. Chiarella, mtpra; Morgan v. United States, .supra;
Commonwealth ex rel. Ciampoli v. Heston, 292 Pa. 501, 141 At1. 287 (1928).
Substitution of the "same transaction," see Stevens v. McClaughry, 207 Fed. 18 (8th
Cir. 1913), for the same evidence rationale, while useful in multiple prosecution cases,
see note 16 supra, would be inappropriate in multiple sentence cases. For such a test
also overlooks the possibility that the legislature may intend that a single transaction be
cumulatively punished.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Michener, supra note 22; Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S.
632 (1915) ; Kendrick v. United States, 238 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Ekberg v. United
States, supra note 22. But see Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 ('1957), and Bell v.
United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955), multiple sentence cases decided on the basis of legis-
lative intent, without reference to the same evidence test. The result is frequently auto-
matic even though the appellate court objects to the trial judge's sentence as unduly
harsh. See Blockburger v. United States, supra note 22, at 305; Beckett v. United States,
84 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1936): "The severity of the sentence has given us much con-
cern .... Nevertheless, we find ourselves powerless to intervene." Convicted of a $1,200
mail fraud under a ten-count indictment, defendant in Beckett was given cumulative
sentences aggregating twenty-five years and $22,000.
24. See cases cited note 36 infra where consecutive sentences were held unvar-
ranted by legislative intent although application of the same evidence test would have
1958]
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The recent case of Gore v. United States typifies appellate disposition of
the multiple sentence problem. 25 For a single narcotics sale, defendant re-
ceived consecutive sentences on each of three counts-sale without a written
order, sale from an unstamped package and facilitating the concealment and
sale of illegally imported drugs. Applying the same evidence test, the court
held that each count stated a different offense. Without further inquiry, the
sentences were affirmed . 2  The concurring opinion, however, recognized that
Congress might not have intended consecutive sentences 27 but was con-
strained to affirm by the Supreme Court decision in Blockburger v. United
States.2 8 Blockburger, the leading precedent in both narcotics 29 and multiple
sentence cases,3 similarly utilized a same evidence test to decide almost iden-
tical issues.31
Apparently, Blockburger indulged a presumption of legislative intent to
allow cumulative punishment of criminal conduct condemned by several statu-
tory provisions.8 2 Since separate provisions independently prescribe penalties
defined multiple offenses. See also Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 377 (1906)
("legislature, not the court which . . . define[s] a crime and ordain[s] its punishment") ;
In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894) ("the law of our country takes care, or should take
care, that not the weight of a judge's finger shall fall upon anyone except as specifically
authorized") ; Ex parte McGuire, 135 Cal. 339, 343, 67 Pac. 327, 329 (1902) (disallow-
ing consecutive sentences unless specifically authorized by the legislature) ; People ex reL.
Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N.Y. 559 (1875) (same).
25. 244 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. granted, 355 U.S. 903 (1958).
26. Id. at 765-66.
27. Id. at 766-67.
28. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
29. United States v. Brisbane, 239 F.2d 859 (3d Cir. 1956) ; United States v. John-
son, 235 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1956) ; Corollo v. Dutton, 63 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1933).
30. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9 (1954); Rawls v. United States, 162 F.2d
798, 799 (10th Cir. 1947) ; United States v. Larney, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 566, 10 C.1.R. 61,
64 (1953) ; State v. Lawrence, 146 Me. 360, 362, 82 A.2d 90, 92 (1951). But see United
States v. Beene, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 177, 178-79, 15 C.M.R. 477, 478-79 (1954) (rejecting
Blockburger's "in vacuo" approach).
31. 284 U.S. at 304; see note 21 supra. Blockbarger's invocation of the same evidence
test was based on three cases, two of which, Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338
(1911), and Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433 (1871), involved double prosecution.
284 U.S. at 304. It affirmed consecutive sentences on Harrison Act counts of sale of nar-
cotics from an unstamped package and sale without a written order although both counts
referred to the same sale. Id. at 301. In Gore, however, a sentence on a third count of
violating the Narcotics Drugs Import and Export Act, 35 STAT. 614 (1909), as amended,
21 U.S.C. § 174 (1952), established by defendant's possession of the narcotics sold in
violation of the Harrison Act, was also prescribed. But the addition of a third count
should not be significant. Enacted as complementary means of dealing with different as-
pects of the same problem, see H.R. RF,. No. 852, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1922);
H.R. REP. No. 23, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3 (1913); H.R. Doc. No. 33, 63d Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, 5 (1913), the statutes have been made unitary for purposes of punishment. The
Boggs Act, 65 STAT. 767 (1951), provided the same penalties for violations of either
statute. Id. at 767, 768.
32. Blockburger alluded only vaguely to legislative intent, 284 U.S. at 305; and there
is no evidence that Congress contemplated consecutive sentences in the event of a single
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for admitted violations, such a presumption has immediate superficial appeal.
Moreover, any technique which permits, yet does not require, courts to im-
pose consecutive sentences commends itself by providing the trial judge with
flexibility in the sentencing process.33 However, neither justification for the
Blockburger presumption appears persuasive. In the related area of lesser
included offenses, courts have never imposed cumulative punishment.34 So
viewed, the need for flexibility and the independence of the statutory pro-
visions would seem to turn on the "includibility" of the several violations
committed by the defendant. Significantly, the concept of included offenses
reflects a continuum of culpability; flexibility is afforded by the concomitant
legislative provision of penalties of varying intensity.35 While a presumption
of legislative intent not to allow cumulative punishment would thus appear
justified in cases involving included offenses, a converse presumption should
not arise because the legislature did not attempt a comparative as well as
comprehensive proscription of the many elements comprising the illicit be-
havior. Presumably recognizing the shortcomings of the Blockburger ration-
narcotics transaction that violated two statutory provisions. Moreover, the penal section
of the Harrison Act was ambiguous. 38 STAT. 789 (1914) : "That any person who violates
or fails to comply with any of the requirements of this Act shall, on conviction, be
fined . .. ." The Boggs Act under which Gore was sentenced contains similar language.
65 STAT. 767, 768 (1951), 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1952), 26 U.S.C. § 2557 (1952). Compare
Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957), reversing consecutive sentences where de-
fendant had committed two statutory offenses and the relevant penal clause stated: "Who-
ever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in subsections (a)
and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by
the use of a dangerous weapon or device shall be fined . . . ." For recent Supreme Court
treatment of ambiguous language in penal laws, see Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83
(1955), quoted note 18 supra; United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S.
218, 221-22 (1952) : "But when choice has to be made between two readings of what con-
duct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alterna-
tive, to require that Congress should have spoken language that is clear and definite. We
should not derive criminal outlawry from some ambiguous implication." But see id. at 221
n.4 (distinguishing Blockburger).
33. See Note, 45 HARv. L. Rav. 535, 540-41 (1932). Of course, flexibility can also be
achieved within the range of minimum to maximum sentences. See, generally, Note, 101
U. PA. L. REv. 257 (1952), describing the discretionary power possessed by sentencing
courts, criticizing abuses and suggesting limitations. See also Harrison v. United States,
7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925) ("it appears to us that the maximum sentence prescribed
by Congress is intended to cover the whole substantive offense in its extremest degree,
no matter in how many different ways a draughtsman may plead it") ; United States v.
Drake, 250 F.2d 216,217 (7th Cir. 1957) (Federal Bank Robbery Act creates a single offense
with various degrees of aggravation permitting sentences of increasing severity).
34. For cases expressly refusing to cumulate in the area, see Rutkowski v. United
States, 149 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1945) ; Costner v. United States, 139 F.2d 429 (4th Cir.
1943) ; Tritico v. United States, 4 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1925) ; Carter v. State, 229 Ind. 205,
96 N.E.2d 273 (1951) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Shaddock v. Ashe, 340 Pa. 286, 17 A.2d
190 (1941) ; Kaufman v. State, 189 Tenn. 315, 225 S.W.2d 75 (1949).
35. See Costner v. United States, supra note 34, at 431; Note, 66 YALE L.J. 427 (.1957)
(homicide); HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 181-84 (1947).
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ale, the Supreme Court has recently abandoned the presumption approach
and upset nonnarcotics consecutive sentences revealed unwarranted by ex-
amination of legislative history.
8 6
36. In Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957), reversing 230 F.2d 568 (5th
Cir. 1956), defendant was consecutively sentenced for entering a bank with intent to com-
mit a robbery and for robbery. The circuit court had affirmed, citing with approval a
factually similar case, Rawls v. United States, 162 F.2d 798, 799 (10th Cir. 1947), which,
in turn, had relied on Blockburger. In Prince, two statutory provisions had been violated
and nothing on the face of the statutes dictated sentencing procedure where both viola-
tions were part of the same transaction. Nevertheless, the Court, reversing cumulative
sentences after reference to legislative intent, found "consistent with our policy of not
attributing to Congress, in the enactment of criminal statutes, an intention to punish more
severely than the language of its laws clearly imports in the light of pertinent legislative
history," that entry with intent to rob merged with the consummated robbery. 352 U.S.
at 329.
A similar approach was used in Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955), reversing
213 F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1.954).
It has been suggested that the Supreme Court has abandoned the same evidence test
in favor of the same transaction approach. Gore v. United States, 244 F.2d 763, 767
(D.C. Cir. 1957) (concurring opinion). But Bell and Prince emphasize the crucial im-
portance of legislative intent and generally ignore the conceptual problem of defining
"off ense."
Judicial interpretation of criminal laws is generally not confined to the face of the
statute. See Heydon's Case, 3 Coke 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. 1584) (object is to discover
"the mischief and defect" contemplated and "what remedy the Parliament hath resolved
and appointed to cure the Disease of the Commonwealth"); Prince v. United States,
supra ("the gravamen of the offense is not in the act of entering. . . . rather the heart
of the crime is the intent to steal") ; cf. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 439
(1935) (dissenting opinion) : "[T]he meaning of a statute is to be looked for, not in any
single section, but in all the parts together and in their relation to the end in view."
Inherently continuous offenses also exemplify the importance of legislative intent in
multiple sentence cases. A continuous criminal course of conduct constitutes only one
offense. But inherent continuity is often not readily apparent. Compare Crepps v. Durden,
Cowp. 640, 98 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B. 1777) (selling bread on Sunday a continuous offense) ;
In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887) (cohabiting with more than one wife inherently con-
tinuous), with Johnson v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923) (seventy-five
poker hands in one evening seventy-five offenses) ; Byrd v. State, 72 Tex. Crim. 265, 162
S.W. 363 (1913) (each day's unlawful medical practice a separate offense). Nor does
the single impulse concept constitute a useful distinction; for as long as different physical
acts occur, each may be accompanied by a separate impulse. Compare Crepps v. Durden,
supra; In re Snow, supra, with Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391 (1916) (mailing
seven letters at the same time to effect a single fraudulent scheme constitutes seven
offenses); Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915) (cutting six mail bags equals six
offenses). A finding of inherent continuity has more properly been based on legislative
intent to punish a course of conduct rather than single physical acts even though each
act is a violation for which the defendant could have been indicted and convicted. See
United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 222 (1952) (if Congress
wanted to attach criminal penalties to each component of a course of conduct "it could
easily have said so") ; MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(1) (e) (conviction for multiple offenses
barred if the offense defined prohibits a course of conduct "unless the law provides that
specific periods of such conduct constitute separate offenses"). Blockburger also dealt
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Similar analysis demonstrates that, contrary to the assumption in Gore and
Blockburger, Congress did not authorize consecutive sentences for each phase
of an illicit drug transaction. Enacted under the commerce and revenue
powers presumably to avoid constitutional objection,37 early narcotics laws
were intended to eliminate nonmedical use and traffic in drugs. 38 Consistent-
ly, enforcement, in no way geared to protecting the revenue,30 has been
directed against "dope peddlers"; and proponents of supplementary narcotics
statutes explicitly cite dope peddling as their target.40 At present, the penal-
ties to be imposed on narcotics offenders are dictated by the amended Boggs
with the continuous course of conduct question. The Court relied on the separate impulse
doctrine and, as it did in considering the allied question involving a single sale-the part
of the opinion discussed in the text-failed to inquire into Congress's actual design,
simply asserting that the Harrison Act was intended to penalize each indictable narcotics
offense. 284 U.S. at 305. See also Greene v. United States, 246 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
(single bargain but two deliveries held two sales separately punishable on six counts).
But see Blockburger v. United States, 50 F.2d 795, 799 (7th Cir. 1931) (dissenting
opinion) : "If in the detecting process the government sees fit to make an installment
affair of it, I do not think the government is in a position to say each installment con-
stitutes a crime."
37. See 43 CoNa. REc. 1396-1400 (1909). Nor were the legislators' apprehensions ill-
founded; the Harrison Act barely survived constitutional tests. United States v. Doremus,
249 U.S. 86 (1919); Alston v. United States, 274 U.S. 289 (1927); Nigro v. United
States, 276 U.S. 332, 341 (1928) ("we must assume that it is a taxing measure, for other-
wise it would be no law at all"). But in light of the expanded scope of the commerce
clause, see United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941), and because the narcotics
laws are part of a scheme implementing treaty commitments of the United States, see H.R.
REP. No. 23, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1913) ; Alston v. United States, supra at 292; King,
supra note 7, at 116; Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 751, 760-63 (1953) ; cf. Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416 (1920), the constitutionality of the narcotics statutes could most likely be
sustained without reference to their revenue features.
38. See authorities cited note 7 supra.
39. In 1956, for example, the administration costs of narcotics laws were 1% times
greater than revenues. TRASURY DEP'T, TRAFFIc ix OPIUMr AND OTHER DANGEROUS
DRUGS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DEC. 31, 1956, 27 (1957). Moreover, legislative and adminis-
trative attempts to differentiate between addict."possession"--offenders and traffickers,
see H.R. REP. No. 2388, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1956); 102 CONG. REc. 10688 (.1956);
97 id. at 8207 (1951) ; Hearings, supra note 10, at 121, 141, evince concern with a prob-
lem unrelated to collection of the nominal one cent per ounce stamp tax, see INT. REV.
CoDE OF 1954, §§ 4701 (a), 4771. Similarly, allowance of the death sentence, 70 STAT. 571
(1956), 21 U.S.C. 176(b) (Supp. IV, 1957), seems an unusual deterrent for tax evasion.
40. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Control of Narcotics of the House
Comnittee on Ways and Means, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1951) ; 97 CONG. REc. 8205-08
(1951) ; testimony of Narcotics Commissioner Anslinger, Hearings, supra note 10, at
121, 123, 127; see Gore v. United States, 244 F.2d 763, 767 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Bazelon,
J., concurring) : "The legislative history of the Narcotic Control Act of 1956 supports the
view that the penalties Congress was providing were for the composite act of drug-peddling,
not for the separate counts into which a prosecutor's ingenuity could divide it. See also
Report to the House Committee on Ways and Means From the Subcommittee on Narcotics,
May 10, 1956, 2 U.S. CODE CONG. SERv. 3304 (1956) : It is recommended that the conzicted
narcotic peddler be sentenced to not less than 5 years for a first offense and not less than
10 years for a second or subsequent offense. (Emphasis added.)"
19581
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Act of 195 1.41 Under that act at the time of the Gore prosecution, sanctions
ranged from not less than two years for a first narcotics offense to not less
than five years for a second.42 If each guilty verdict resulting from the usual
multiple indictment were intended as an index of punishment, a single sale
of narcotics could yield a sentence of forty-five years on a first conviction on
multiple counts ;43 yet the maximum sentence provided for a "third offender"
was only twenty years. 44 Not only does the Gore adaptation of the Block-
burger approach thus render the provisions of the Boggs Act meaningless, it
undermines the legislative objective to promote uniform sentencing procedure
for narcotics violators.45 For the complex of varying indictments and conse-
cutive or concurrent sentences it makes possible destroys any potential uni-
formity.46 Since the statutes defining narcotics violations and the Boggs Act
41. 65 STAT. 767 (1951), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 174 (Supp. IV, 1957), INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 7237.
42. 65 STAT. 767 (1951), 21 U.S.C. § 174, 26 U.S.C. § 2557(b) (1) (1952).
43. Such a sentence admittedly carries the same evidence test to an extreme, but,
within the framework of the test, see notes 22, 23 supra, a logical extreme, for each
separate sentence might hypothetically be based on different evidence. A single sale of
narcotics could elicit counts of: (1) purchase of narcotics from an unstamped package;
(2) selling narcotics from an unstamped package; (3) dispensing narcotics from an un-
stamped package; (4) sale of narcotics without a written order form; (5) buying illegally
imported narcotics; (6) receiving illegally imported narcotics; (7) concealing illegally
imported narcotics; (8) facilitating the transportation of illegally imported narcotics;
(9) selling illegally imported narcotics. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 2553-54, 53 STAT.
271 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4704-05) ; 35 STAT. 614 (1909), as amended, 21
U.S.C. § 173 (1952). And counts (1) and (5)-(9) could be proved merely by possession
at the time of the sale. See note 11 supra. The same evidence approach permits imprison-
ment for 45 years; a second offender might be sentenced to prison for 90 years; while a
third offense could be punished by a prison sentence of 180 years. See 65 STAT. 767 (1951),
21 U.S.C. § 174, 26 U.S.C. § 2557 (1952). Indeed, in Gore, defendant was sentenced
from 3-15 years on a first conviction, while a second offender could be incarcerated no
longer than 10 years. In Martinez v. United States, 220 F.2d 740 (1st Cir. 1955), an
ingenious prosecutor fashioned thirteen counts out of a single narcotics sale, and separate
sentences, some concurrent, were upheld on all counts. Fragmentation of the Narcotic
Drugs Export and Import Act (see counts (5)-(9) in hypothetical, supra) was allowed be-
cause the statute "in the disjunctive established multiple offenses. .. . Congress intended
to place its condemnation upon each distinct, separate part of every transaction . . . ." Id.
at 742-43. For suggestion that imposition of consecutive sentences may in aggravated
cases violate the constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, see Kirch-
heimer, supra note 18, at 513-14 n.2 .
44. 65 STAT. 767 (1951), 21 U.S.C. § 174, 26 U.S.C. § 2557(b)(1) (1952).
45. H.R. REP. No. 635, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1951).
46. The defendant in Gore, a first offender, was sentenced to from 1-5 years on three
counts, the sentences to run consecutively. Although 1-5 years does not appear to satisfy
the statutory minimum, see note 41 supra, it represented a compromise dictated by the
District of Columbia indeterminate sentence laws, see D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-203 (Supp.
1957). Since a minimum sentence can not exceed one third of the maximum in the Dis-
trict, the 2-5 years required by the narcotics laws would be illegal. However, the in-
determinate sentence law provides that parole may not be granted until the minimum has
been served. Because the maximum sentence must be at least three times the minimum,
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providing relevant penalties both contemplate proscription of a course of con-
duct, consecutive sentences should not be imposed when the prosecution
frames an indictment isolating the segments of the total transgression.
47
In other contexts, a legislative intent to proscribe a course of conduct rather
than its elements may not be readily discernible. Particularly will this be
true of overlapping statutes obviously enacted without reference to one an-
other. Indeed, investigation under these circumstances will most likely reveal
no specific evidence of legislative intent. When confronted with a prosecution
involving such unrelated offenses, the courts may have greatest success in
divining legislative purpose if they consider the social norms vindicated by
the relevant statutory provisions.48 Vindication of a single social norm should,
it was considered the "real" sentence and analogized to an ordinary federal sentence under
which parole may be extended after one third of the time has been served. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 4204 (1952). Thus, the 1-5 year sentence was said to satisfy the Boggs Act requirement
of a 2-year minimum because 5 years is the "real" sentence. See Hearings, szupra note
10, at 1260-61. Since Gore is not eligible for parole for 3 years, his sentence is approxi-
mately equivalent to a 9-year sentence in any other federal district. Congress has since
provided that the District's indeterminate sentence laws are inapplicable in naroctics cases.
70 STAT. 569 (1956), IxT. RE,. CODE OF 1954, § 7237(d) (2). On the desirability of uni-
form sentencing generally, see Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Resposbility,
65 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1292 (1952); U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTIcE, FEDERA. PRusoNs 1957, 1-3
(1958).
47. Comparison with sentences imposed for other crimes aids evaluation of legislative
intent in the Boggs Act. In the House Committee Report, narcotics sentences were said
to be inadequate when compared with crimes "of equal social significance." For a com-
pilation of minimum mandatory sentences in twenty-four states (Alabama through Mon-
tana), see Hearings, supra note 10, at 1466. The averages are approximately: arson: 1Y
years; burglary: 3 years; forgery: 1Y2 years; larceny: 1 year; kidnapping: life imprison-
ment; rape: 8 years (equating two life imprisonments and one death sentence to 45 years
each) ; robbery: 5 years. Although the soundness of the congressional approach to the
narcotic addiction problem has been questioned, see Finestone, Narcotics and Criminality,
22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 69, 79-83 (1957); Lindesmith, The British System of Nar-
cotics Control, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 138, 146-49 (1957) ; King, supra note 7, Con-
gress without doubt considers narcotics violations particularly odious, see, e.g., 70 STAT. 571
(1956), 21 U.S.C. § 176(b) (Supp. IV, 1957) (authorizing death sentence for sales of heroin
to persons under eighteen). Under present laws, a first offender could, on the single count
conviction of sale without a written order, receive a 20-year no-parole sentence. See INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7237(d) (1.). Such a sentence would generally be equivalent to
three times that possible for bank robbery. See Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113 (1952) ; Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957); United States v. Drake,
250 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1957) ; Federal Parole Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1952). A federal
prisoner under sentence of life, or of 45 years or more, is eligible for parole after 15
years. Ibid. Thus, a 20-year no-parole sentence on one count could in effect be more
severe than a life sentence.
48. See United States v. Beene, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 177, 15 C.M.R. 477 (1954).
Different tests may be appropriate in gauging legislative purpose in other multiple
sentence cases. See note 5 supra. Thus, cumulative sentences may be intended where
defendant's conduct results in physical injury to several individuals. See Ladner v. United
States, 230 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 282 (1958) (consecutive
sentences allowed where a single shotgun blast wounded two federal officers). A different
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consistent with the concept of lesser included offenses 49 and the current
adaptation of merger and consummation,50 be suggestive of an intent not to
allow cumulative punishment.51 For example, assault with a deadly weapon
and illegal possession of a firearm each assert society's interest in protection
of the person; consequently, punishment geared to the graver rather than the
sum of offenses should fulfill the community's penological objectives. 2 In
contrast, a single act which violates laws prohibiting Sunday sales and liquor
test may prevail where property interests are concerned. See United States v. Taylor, 6
U.S.C.M.A. 289, 20 C.M.R. 5 (1956) (only one punishable larceny where several articles,
the property of different persons, were stolen at the same time and place). Contra, Oddo
v. United States, 171 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949) (separately punishable charges permitted
where defendant stole a truck containing merchandise consigned to different owners).
For discussion of various possible tests, see Kirchheimer, supra note 18; Horack, The
Multiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act, 21 MINN. L. Rav. 805 (1937) ; Com-
ment, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 363-68 (1956).
For a general discussion of legislative intent problems, see Bickel & Wellington, Legis-
lative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Linwoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. Rnv. 1,
14-18 (1957). While judicial interpretation of legislative intent may ordinarily be cor-
rected by the legislature, "permanent institutional attributes" occasionally render cor-
rection impracticable. Thus, Congress was not realistically allowed the last word when
the Court found that the Mann Act applied to polygamy, since congressional reversal
would have appeared tantamount to condoning polygamy. Id. at 17 n.67.
49. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
50. At common law, misdemeanors were merged with felonies when charged in the
same indictment. A misdemeanor defendant had procedural rights denied an accused felon.
Thus, merger prevented the felon from profiting because his conduct also constituted a
misdemeanor. This rule has been eliminated by statute or decision in most states. MILLER,
CaImlAI. LAW 51 (1934). But see People v. Vollmer, 299 N.Y. 347, 349, 87 N.E.2d 291,
292 (1949) (misdemeanor assault "a component of, and merged into, the homicide on
trial"). However, modern commentators have urged and some criminal codes provide
that where a defendant is convicted of both attempt (or conspiracy) to commit a crime
and commission of that crime, the attempt is "merged" (or the conspiracy is "consumed")
and only a single punishment may be imposed. Wis. STAT. § 939.72 (1955); MODsL
PENAL CODE §§ 1.08(1) (a), (b); Kirchheimer, supra note 18, at 517-22; see Prince v.
United States, 352 U.S. 322, 328 (1957) (entry with intent to rob "merged" with robbery;
based on congressional intent); Brooks v. United States, 223 F.2d 393, 394 (10th Cir.
1955) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Tokarchik v. Claudy, 174 Pa. Super. 509, 513, 102 A.2d
207, 209 (1954); cf. LuGoz, COMMIENTAIRE DU CODE PtNAL SuIssE art. 68 (1939) (if
defendant sentenced for more than one offense, penalty limited to no more than one and
one-half times the maximum for the most serious offense); Grant, The Lanza Rule of
Successive Prosecutions, 32 CoLum. L. Rav. 1309, 1323 (1932) (asserting that under
French law defendant may be tried and convicted of two or more distinct offenses growing
out of a single line of conduct but may only be punished for the most severe).
51. For classifications of social norms, see DassioN, CRIIMINAL LAW ADInaIsTRA-
TION AND PUBLIC ORDER viii (1948) (offenses against the person or reputation: depriva-
tions of well being and respect; offenses against property: deprivations of wealth; offenses
against authority: deprivations of power; offenses against morality: deprivations of
rectitude) ; Allen, The Nature of a Crime, 13 J. Comp1. LEG. & INTI L. (3d ser.) 1, 24-25
(1931).
52. Application of the same evidence test, of course, yields the Opposite result. See
Kendrick v. United States, 238 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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sales to minors would be cumulatively punishable since one statute vindicates
religious values, and the other is directed toward protecting minors.53 The
various objectives of criminal law-reformation, rehabilitation, retribution,
isolation and deterrence 5 4 -are also relevant in determining probable, but
unexpressed, legislative design. For instance, if fragmentation would increase
a forty-year maximum sentence to three hundred and sixty years, the more
severe penalty is unlikely to serve any purpose not already fulfilled.5 5 Acting
in a context which limits punishment by the will of the body that defines
crime, courts in multiple conviction cases should abandon automatic and in-
appropriate application of the same evidence test and focus on legislative in-
tent instead.
53. See Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 364 (1956) ; ALI DRAFT 16 (condoning double
prosecution) ; Ruble v. State, 51 Ark. 170, 10 S.W. 262 (1888) (same); Commonwealth
v. Vaughn, 101 Ky. 603, 42 S.W. 117 (1897) (same). However, multiple prosecutions
may not be allowed under modern pleading rules requiring joint indictment for offenses
arising out of the same transaction, see note 4 supra, even though separate punishable
offenses have been committed, see note 17 supra and accompanying text.
Although the majority of multiple sentence cases would probably involve, as Gore did,
statutory provisions implementing the same social norm, exact definition is sometimes
difficult. See, e.g., United States v. Dicario, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 353, 362, 24 C.M.R. 163, 172
(1957) (dissenting opinion; mail theft and larceny offend different norms).
54. See MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 1-17
(1940) ; HALL & GLUECK, CRIIINAL LAW 1.9-24 (1940). In the narcotics context, refor-
mation and rehabilitation are particularly pertinent. A majority of convicted and sen-
tenced narcotics peddlers are addicts who become "pushers" in order to pay for their own
supply. See Hearings, supra note 10, at 1225. Proper treatment of an addict takes an
average of four and one-half months; and extended incarceration may have an adverse
effect upon the convict-patient. Testimony of Dr. Harris Isbell, Director, Research Divi-
sion, U.S. Public Health Service Hospital, Lexington, Ky., Hearings, supra note 40, at
199. Nevertheless, the main purpose of narcotics legislation appears deterrent and retri-
butive. H.R. REP. No. 635, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1951); 97 CONG. REc. 8204-09
(1951); H.R. REP. No. 2388, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1953); 70 STAT. 571 (1956), 21
U.S.C. § 176(b) (Supp. IV, 1957) (permitting imposition of death sentence for sale or gift of
heroin to juveniles). However, the deterrent'effect of narcotics laws on addict-sellers is
questionable. See Statement of James V. Bennett, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons,
Hearings, supra note 10, at 1218: "[The addict] has lost his power to resist drugs and no
amount of punitive treatment can deter him."
55. Under present narcotics laws, for example, a third offense may be punished by a
no-parole sentence of forty years and a fine of $20,000. 70 STAT. 570 (1956), 21 U.S.C.
§ 174 (Supp. IV, 1957), INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7237. Thus, consecutive sentences
could yield up to 360 years and fines totalling $180,000. See note 43 supra.
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